1.1. Universitet. Chto on myslit? -- 1.2. Universitet. Chto on mozhet? -- 1.3. ... i chego ne mozhet? -- 2.1. Nauka. Zachem ėto nuzhno? -- 2.2. Obrazovanie. Kakoe obrazovanie? -- 2.3. Akademicheskie vobody. Dli︠a︡ chego? -- Zakli︠u︡chenie -- Chto pochitatʹ ob Universitete?

Изложено понимание рассуждения как метода рационального познания, рассмотрены его разновидности: аргументативные, интерпретативные, прогностические, квалификационные и вычислительные. Для аспирантов и соискателей.

RESUMO O Discourse Diversity Database (3D) é um corpus desenvolvido para a pesquisa em linguística clínica. Ele consiste de amostras de fala oral de três gêneros diferentes: narrativas induzidas por imagens, histórias pessoais e instruções baseadas em imagens. As subdivisões do 3D incluem gravações de falantes de russo de três grupos independentes: pessoas com tumores cerebrais antes e depois da remoção do tumor, pessoas com esquizofrenia e indivíduos neurologicamente saudáveis. O presente artigo é dedicado à descrição do procedimento de coleta (...) de dados, do esquema de anotação e das características específicas de cada subdivisão do corpus. (shrink)

The general mitigating and aggravating circumstances of criminal liability are elements attached to the crime that, when they occur, affect the punishment quantum. Cuban criminal legislation provides a catalog of such circumstances and some general conditions for their application. Such norms give judges broad discretion in assessing circumstances and adjusting punishment based on the intensity of those circumstances. In the interest of broad judicial discretion, the law does not establish specific ways for measuring circumstances’ intensity. This gives judges more freedom (...) and autonomy, but it also imposes on them more social responsibility and challenges them to manage the uncertainty and subjectivity inherent in this complex activity. This paper proposes a model to aid the linguistic assessment of circumstances’ intensity and to provide linguistic and numerical recommendations to determine an appropriate punishment interval. M-LAMAC determines the collective evaluation of circumstances of the same type, determines the prevalence of a type of circumstance by means of a compensation function, recommends the required modification in the input interval, and finally recommends a numerical interval adjusted to the judges’ initially expressed preferences. The model’s applicability is demonstrated by means of several experiments on a fictitious case of bank document forgery. (shrink)

gl. 1. Ėkofilosofii︠a︡ kak zhiznesokhrani︠a︡i︠u︡shchiĭ kulʹturnyĭ proekt -- gl. 2. Obrazy kulʹtury mira v istoriko-personologicheskom izmerenii -- gl. 3. Borʹba za mir v sovremennom mire : opyt, kont︠s︡ept︠s︡ii, modeli resheniĭ.

Wittgenstein’s concepts shed light on the phenomenon of schizophrenia in at least three different ways: with a view to empathy, scientific explanation, or philosophical clarification. I consider two different “positive” wittgensteinian accounts―Campbell’s idea that delusions involve a mechanism of which different framework propositions are parts, Sass’ proposal that the schizophrenic patient can be described as a solipsist, and a Rhodes’ and Gipp’s account, where epistemic aspects of schizophrenia are explained as failures in the ordinary background of certainties. I argue that (...) none of them amounts to empathic-phenomenological understanding, but they provide examples of how philosophical concepts can contribute to scientific explanation, and to philosophical clarification respectively. (shrink)

ResumoO argumento do milagre afirma que o realismo científico é a melhor explicação para o sucesso da ciência:teorias científicas são bem-sucedidas porque são verdadeiras, e cientistas são bem-sucedidos em encontrarteorias verdadeiras porque se baseiam em normas metodológicas confiáveis. A tese da incomensurabilidademetodológica afirma que teorias científicas não são escolhidas através de um algoritmo neutro de normas epistêmicas. Isso revela uma lacuna na explicação realista: normas epistêmicas confiáveis não são suficientes para conduzir a escolhas de teorias verdadeiras, pois tais escolhas também (...) são determinadas por outros fatores além de normas epistêmicas. A introdução de fatores adicionais como subdeterminando a escolha de teorias engendrou argumentos relativistas e antirrealistas contra o realismo. A explicação realista pode ser reabilitada se postular que os cientistas possuem autoridade epistêmica para aprimorar as normas metodológicas da ciência, sendo aptos a tomar decisões autônomas em vez de regidas por regras.AbstractThe no miracles argument claims that scientific realism is the best explanation to science’s success: scientifictheories are empirically successful because they are truthlike, and scientists are successful in theory-choices because they rely on reliable methodological norms. The methodological incommensurability thesis claims that there is no neutral algorithm for theory-choice. It reveals a gap in the realist explanation: reliable epistemic norms are not sufficient to guarantee successful theory-choices, because theory- choices are also determined by other factors besides epistemic norms. The introduction of additional factors as underdetermining theory-choices motivates relativist and antirealist positions. But the realist explanation can be rehabilitated if it postulates that scientists have epistemic authority to develop methodological norms, being apt to take decisions which are autonomous rather than rule-driven. (shrink)

The theory of intentionality is the most important core of the theoretical inheritance of E. Husserl’s phenomenology. Starting from this awareness, Levinas carries out a deep research within the phenomenology in order to see whether «intentionality exhausts modalities in which the thought is meaningful». This paper will try to show how the French-Lituan philosopher, going over the genetic phenomenology research which comes to a precategorial issue, can point out the «pre-intentional», or better the «non-intentional», the original «passivity» of conscience which (...) is not the negation of subjectivity, but instead the possibility of «giving» of transcendency. This «would not be a missed immanency», but would have in sociality – responsibility of the neighbour – the own spiritual excellency, which is the perfection of God. (shrink)

Philosophers have debated for millennia about whether moral requirements are always rational to follow. The background for these debates is often what I shall call “the self-interest model.” The guiding assumption here is that the basic demand of reason, to each person, is that one must, above all, advance one's self-interest. Alternatively, debate may be framed by a related, but significantly different, assumption: the idea that the basic rational requirement is to develop and pursue a set of personal ends in (...) an informed, efficient, and coherent way, whether one's choice of ends is based on self-interested desires or not. For brevity I refer to this as “the coherence-and-efficiency model.” Advocates of both models tend to think that, while it is sufficiently clear in principle what the rational thing to do is, what remains in doubt is whether it is always rational to be moral. They typically assume that morality is concerned, entirely or primarily, with our relations to others, especially with obligations that appear to require some sacrifice or compromise with the pursuit of self-interest. (shrink)

Contract is the dominant model for political philosophy's understanding of government grounded on the consent of the governed. However, there are at least five disabilities attached to classical social contract theory: the grounding contract never actually occurred; its provisions are vague and contestable; the stringency of the obligation thereby established is dubious; trans-generational consent is questionable; interpretive methods for giving effect to the contract are ill-specified. By contrast, the biblical story of the covenant Israel embraces at Sinai is shown to (...) be more adequately attentive to each of these five desiderata. The essay then focuses on the U.S. Constitution, arguing that in many ways it is more reflective of covenantal legitimating themes than those of social contract. The result is a promisingly different mode of understanding government by the consent of the governed. (shrink)

In this paper I shall venture into an area with which I am not very familiar and in which I feel far from confident; namely into phenomenology. My main motive is not to get away from standard, boring, methodological questions like those of induction and demarcation; but the conviction that a phenomenological account of the empirical basis forms a necessary complement to Popper's falsificationism. According to the latter, a scientific theory is a synthetic and universal, hence unverifiable proposition. In fact, (...) in order to be technologically useful, a scientific hypothesis must refer to future states-of-affairs; it ought therefore to remain unverified. But in order to be empirical, a theory must bear some kind of relation to factual statements. According to Popper, such a relation can only be one of potential conflict. Thus a theory T will be termed scientific if and only if T is logically incompatible with a so-called basic statement b, where b is both empirically verifiable and empirically falsifiable. In other words: T is scientific if it entails ¬b; where b, hence also ¬b, is an empirically decidable proposition. (shrink)

s div class="title" a terTwo Notions of Being: Entity and Essence s /div a ter - Volume 62 - E. J. Lowe.

Imagine a society of fisherfolk, who, in the state of nature, fish on a lake of finite size. Fishing on the lake is characterized by decreasing returns to scale in labor, because the lake's finite size imply that each successive hour of fishing labor is less effective than the previous one, as the remaining fish become less dense in the lake. In the state of nature, the lake is commonly owned: each fishes as much as he pleases, and, we might (...) suppose, calculates his fishing plan by taking the labor of the others as given, as he sees it. Each knows that the distribution of fish will be proportional to labor expended among the fisherfolk: if I fish twice as long as you, I will end up with twice as much fish as you. This is not due to some kind of concern with equity among the fisherfolk; it is a technological fact, implied by the assumption that fishing labor is homogeneous, and all are equally likely to catch a fish in a unit of time. An equilibrium under common ownership can be thought of as a Nash equilibrium of the game where each computes his optimal fishing plan, given the labor of the others and knowing what the consequent distribution of fish would be. (shrink)

In this innovative study of the relationship between persons and their bodies, E. J. Lowe demonstrates the inadequacy of physicalism, even in its mildest, non-reductionist guises, as a basis for a scientifically and philosophically acceptable account of human beings as subjects of experience, thought and action. He defends a substantival theory of the self as an enduring and irreducible entity - a theory which is unashamedly committed to a distinctly non-Cartesian dualism of self and body. Taking up the physicalist challenge (...) to any robust form of psychophysical interactionism, he shows how an attribution of independent causal powers to the mental states of human subjects is perfectly consistent with a thoroughly naturalistic world view. He concludes his study by examining in detail the role which conscious mental states play in the human subject's exercise of its most central capacities for perception, action, thought and self-knowledge. (shrink)

Recently, the concept of "gender identity" has enjoyed a great deal of attention in gender metaphysics. This seems to be motivated by the goal of creating trans-inclusive theory, by explaining trans people's genders. In this paper, we aim to unmotivate this project. Notions of "gender identity" serve important pragmatic purposes for trans people, such as satisfying the curiosity of non-trans people, and, relatedly, securing our access to important goods like legal rights and medical care. However, we argue that this does (...) not mean that "gender identity" is a metaphysically substantial thing that deserves extensive theoretical attention. There are reasons to be skeptical of such a concept. We trace the history of "gender identity," primarily to identify its roots in trans-antagonistic medical theory and its connections to the problematic "wrong-body" model--a legacy that has pathologized and flattened trans experience. Moreover, we argue that trans people primarily use "gender identity" to explain ourselves to non-trans people, rather than to discuss ourselves among ourselves. Thus, we urge theorists to resist the urge to substantiate gender identity. Instead, we encourage the development of new and better concepts, ones that attend to the lived realities of trans community and the flourishing gender terms and practices that are constructed there. If these lived realities are taken seriously, there is no need to “explain” trans people’s genders; we can simply see them as they are. (shrink)

The science underlying global warming, climate change, and the connections between these phenomena are reviewed. Projected future climate changes under various plausible scenarios of future human behavior are explored, as are the potential impacts of projected climate changes on society, ecosystems, and our environment. The economic, security, and ethical considerations relevant to determining the threat posed by climate change are subsequently assessed. The article then discusses the various means available for climate change mitigation, focusing on the relative strengths and weaknesses (...) of various societal alternatives including ‘geoengineering’ and transitioning to less carbon intensive energy sources. The article concludes with the author's views as to what steps might most profitably be taken to avert dangerous anthropogenic interference with Earth's climate, and the ramifications if such steps are not taken. (shrink)

Encore un livre sur saint Thomas, dira-t-on. Que pourrait ajouter celui-ci à tout ce qui existe déjà? Nous voudrions d'abord dans cet ouvrage répondre simplement mais en vérité, et en lisant les textes eux-mêmes de saint Thomas et d'Aristote, à certaines objections ou lieux communs entendus ou lus plus ou moins régulièrement, qui empêchent de commencer à vouloir connaître la pensée de frère Thomas. Il s'agit de mettre en évidence la grande richesse, pour l'intelligence et le coeur humains, de sa (...) pensée philosophique, de ses analyses, de ses manières de poser les questions et d'interroger le réel. Un préambule pour une introduction à la philosophie de Thomas, telle est essentiellement l'intention de ces quatre études et non pas une introduction à la philosophie thomasienne purement et simplement. Elles cherchent ainsi à définir l'esprit d'un apprentissage philosophique qui a aussi en lui tout ce qui convient pour aider à un apprentissage théologique et spirituel, mystique même. (shrink)

The path of those who would approach the study of Bentham's writings on Evidence has been considerably smoothed by the recent publication of William Twining's work on the evidence theories of Bentham and Wigmore. The material on evidence is now being tackled by the Bentham Project. It presents no easy task. The central core, The Rationale of Judicial Evidence, edited and published by John Stuart Mill in 1827, exists only in the printed version, the MSS from which Mill worked having (...) disappeared. But a substantial body of related material which survives has yet to be thoroughly investigated, though William Twining has made a gallant start. A new edition of the work hitherto known as ‘An Introductory View of the Rationale of Evidence’, first printed in full in the Bowring edition of the Works of Jeremy Bentham is in preparation. The first fruits of this endeavour is that the title of that work as it should appear in due course in the new Collected Works will be Introduction to the Rationale of Evidence: An Introductory View for the Use of Lawyers as well as Non-lawyers, the title in fact given to the work by Bentham. It is intended that what follows should similarly be of use to non-lawyers as well as lawyers. (shrink)

In 1954 H. L. A. Hart wrote that Austin's work has ‘never, since his death … been ignored’. If it never has been completely ignored, interest in it has periodically waxed and waned. The interest definitely waxed in the 1980s. More books were published about Austin in this period than in any other decade since his death in 1859. Although this literature contains discussions of some of the nineteenth-century responses to his work, they are not the focus of it. Certain (...) of the responses remain completely in the dark, while there is more light to shed on at least some of the others. In short, our knowledge of nineteenth-century interpretations of Austin's legal philosophy is very incomplete. (shrink)

There is an undercurrent to be detected in Anselm's record of the meditative experience that issued in the Ontological Argument and, although it points to a profound and perennial problem in the interpretation of religion, this undercurrent has been largely ignored. The Argument, as is well known, moves entirely within the medium of reflective meaning focused on the idea of God and, unlike the cosmological arguments of later theologians, it makes no appeal whatever to a principle of causality or to (...) the discovery of a sufficient reason for finite existence. Anselm seems to have had his own sense of what one may call the unadulterated rationalism of the Argument when, in his own words, he wondered, ‘if perhaps it might be possible to find one single argument that for its proof required no other save itself, and that by itself would suffice to prove that God really exists’. Here we are entirely within that inner chamber of the mind so dear to the Augustinian tradition, a mind from which one is to exclude all thought save that of God. The task of the one who reflects is to penetrate the inner meaning of this thought in order to discover what it implies beyond what is evident on the surface. With such an eminently rational or logical aim occupying the centre of attention, it is quite understandable that the presence of another, and quite opposed, concern should have been overlooked - Anselm's concern, namely, to transcend, as it were, the medium of thought itself, and enter into the presence of God. The reason that this concern introduces a tension in the search for a proof is that the realization of presence would seem to render proof superfluous, while the inference in an argument - especially one moving towards existence – inevitably suggests, in some sense and to some degree, the absence of what is sought for. (shrink)

Préface.--De la nécessité historique du judéo-alexandrinisme.--Le juéo-alexandrinisme avant Philon.--Vie de Philon le Juif.--Classement de ses traités. Premier aspect de son œuvre.--Exposition de la philosophie de Philon.--Examen de la philosophie de Philon.

As Sir Thomas Browne solemnly observed in his Religio Medici, “Heresies perish not with their authors but, like the river Arethusa, though they have lost their currents in one place, they rise up in another.” So too with the economist's valuation of life, the heresy being that–without seriously challenging the current concept of subjective valuation of changes in risk–economists have regressed to the once-persistent belief that it bears some quantitative relation, if not to expected earnings, at least to the utility (...) of expected earnings or capital or consumption. This old-tyme recipe for estimating the value of a human life – notwithstanding the ornate convolutions and occasional intellectual effronteries to be found in the more recent versions–is much like that for calculating the value of a two-week honeymoon for a loving couple by reference to their anticipated outlays plus perhaps an allowance for the probability of non-consummation owing to frigidity in either. (shrink)

G.E. Moore, more than either Bertrand Russell or Ludwig Wittgenstein, was chiefly responsible for the rise of the analytic method in twentieth-century philosophy. This selection of his writings shows Moore at his very best. The classic essays are crucial to major philosophical debates that still resonate today. Amongst those included are: * A Defense of Common Sense * Certainty * Sense-Data * External and Internal Relations * Hume's Theory Explained * Is Existence a Predicate? * Proof of an External World (...) In addition, this collection also contains the key early papers in which Moore signals his break with idealism, and three important previously unpublished papers from his later work which illustrate his relationship with Wittgenstein. (shrink)

Les auteurs de cet ouvrage ont cherché à approfondir les fondements de la rationalité en philosophie des sciences pour montrer ce qu'une pensée rationnelle peut apporter à la démarche scientifique, pour mieux analyser un raisonnement ou les résultats d'une expérience. Les deux grands épistémologues et philosophes des sciences, Gaston Bachelard et Alexandre Koyré, les ont beaucoup inspirés dans leurs travaux, notamment sur la question du déterminisme. La pensée logique héritée d'Aristote, réduite au modus ponens, ne suffit pas aujourd'hui pour comprendre (...) l'avancée séculaire et fulgurante des connaissances en sciences. Les auteurs présentent à cet effet une étude des différentes méthodes de raisonnements. L'histoire des mathématiques, du point de vue de son épistémologie, fait l'objet d'un chapitre riche en citations montrant l'évolution de la pensée logique, d'Euclide à la théorie des ensembles, outil nécessaire à la progression des connaissances scientifiques. La mise en oeuvre de mesures expérimentales tenant compte des erreurs de mesure, suppose l'exploitation d'outils mathématiques et statistiques, illustrés par des exemples. Par leur approche zététique et épistémologique des connaissances, les auteurs ont souhaité que la pensée rationnelle ne s'efface pas sous le déferlement médiatique de certaines dérives et perversions de l'esprit scientifique propres aux altersciences, comme le scientisme, le positivisme ou le relativisme. (shrink)

We dedicate this book to John Thibaut. He was mentor and personal friend to one of us, and his work had a profound intellectual influence on both of us. We were both strongly influenced by Thibaut's insightful articulation of the importance to psychology of the concept of pro cedural justice and by his empirical work with Laurens Walker in reactions to legal institu demonstrating the role of procedural justice tions. The great importance we accord the Thibaut and Walker work is (...) evident throughout this volume. If anyone person can be said to have created an entire field of inquiry, John Thibaut created the psychological study of procedural justice. (To honor Thibaut thus in no sense reduces our recognition of the contributions of his co-worker, Laurens Walker, in the creation of the field. We are as certain that Walker would endorse our statement as we are that Thibaut, with characteristic modesty, would demur from it. ) Even to praise Thibaut in this fashion falls short of recognizing all of his contributions to procedural justice. Not only did he initiate the psy chological study of the topic, he also built much of the intellectual foun dation upon which the study of procedural justice rests. Thibaut's work with Harold Kelley (1959; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978) created a social psy chological theory of interdependence that, among many other applica tions, serves as the basis for one of the major models of the psychology of procedural justice. (shrink)

Toujours, les révolutions s'inversent en terreur, la libération fait naître la domination, le pouvoir abuse, ment, échoue... Pourquoi continue-t-on pourtant à croire que le gouvernement des hommes a pour but de transformer la société alors qu'il se réduit souvent à une gestion de la situation? C'est cette question qui résonne singulièrement en ces temps de changement de gouvernance que lance ici Etienne Tassin, se reposant sur une formule de Merleau-Ponty : "On veut oublier un problème que l'Europe soupçonne depuis les (...) Grecs : n'y a-t-il pas un maléfice de la vie à plusieurs?" Les Grecs seront donc nos guides pour éclairer notre démocratie contemporaine, Oreste pour appréhender la question de la justice, Oedipe celle du maléfice, Antigone la dissidence, Socrate l'utopie, Caton les révolutions, Gygès les oubliés du régime libéral, Achille le courage, Diogène la question des migrants... Ils nous aideront à affronter cette idée tragique : il n'y a pas de bonne solution, la politique n'est pas une affaire de réussite ou d'échec mais de risque, celui de vivre à plusieurs. Elle est la condition humaine. (shrink)

Thomas E. Hill, Jr., interprets and extends Kant's moral theory in a series of essays that highlight its relevance to contemporary ethics. He introduces the major themes of Kantian ethics and explores its practical application to questions about revolution, prison reform, and forcible interventions in other countries for humanitarian purposes.

O presente artigo examina o projecto ético-politico de Richard Rorty nas suas vertentes teórica (enquanto projecto ideal de sociedade - a democracia liberal) e prática (enquanto tentativa de efectivação dessa Utopia). Porém, uma análise atenta permite concluir que ele redunda no seguinte paradoxo: por um lado, Rorty argumenta que a democracia liberal é o 'melhor regime político', mas, por outro, admite que ele não é realizável na prática. O autor do artigo vai mais longe: se fosse realizável, tornar-se-ia num dos (...) 'piores regimes políticos'. Sugere-se que as diflculdades no pensamento rortyano não estão tanto nos pressupostos, mas antes no modo como deriva as suas conclusões porque: algumas vezes as conclusões não são deriváveis das premissas; noutras são simplesmente contraditórias. /// This article examines Richard Rorty s ethical and political project both in its theoretical (as an ideal social project - a liberal democracy) and practical (as an attempt to implement this Utopia) aspects. However, a closer analysis permits us to conclude that it falls into the following paradox: on the one hand, Rorty argues that liberal democracy is the 'best political regime', but, on the other, he admits that it cannot be put into practice. The author of the article goes further: if it could be realized, it would be one of the 'worst political regimes'. It is suggested that the difficulties in Rorty's thought are not so much at the level of the presuppositions but rather in the way it derives its conclusions because: sometimes the conclusions are not derivable from the premises; at other times they are simply contradictory. (shrink)

Frant︠s︡uzʹka revoli︠u︡t︠s︡ii︠a︡: prokhodz︠h︡enni︠a︡ cherez smertʹ -- Romantyzm i khytristʹ dobra: Mefistofel i︠a︡k kulʹturnyĭ heroĭ -- Narodz︠h︡enni︠a︡ totalʹnosti: slabkistʹ indyvida, syla kolektyvnykh til -- Klas i︠a︡k hrupa obranykh: marksyzm -- Rasa i︠a︡k "use": rasyzm i zakhid -- Hotui︠u︡chysʹ do katastrof: palinhenesii︠a︡ i kinet︠s︡ʹ stolitti︠a︡ -- Fashyzm: triumf transheokratiï -- Nat︠s︡yzm: rasa i︠a︡ zakon -- Komunizm: vid emansypat︠s︡iï do rabstva -- Rosiĭsʹka ideolohii︠a︡: sumishi ta ekstremy -- Zamistʹ vysnovkiv: plynnistʹ ideolohiĭ i XXI stolitti︠a︡.

There is currently intense interest in the question of the source of our presumed knowledge of truths concerning what is, or is not, metaphysically possible or necessary. Some philosophers locate this source in our capacities to conceive or imagine various actual or non-actual states of affairs, but this approach is open to certain familiar and seemingly powerful objections. A different and ostensibly more promising approach has been developed by Timothy Williamson, according to which our capacity for modal knowledge is just (...) an extension, or by-product, of our general capacity to acquire knowledge of true counterfactual conditionals — a capacity that we deploy ubiquitously in everyday life. Williamson’s account crucially involves a thesis to the effect that modal truths can be explained in terms of counterfactual truths. In this paper, I query Williamson’s account on a number of points, including this thesis. My positive proposal, which owes a debt to the work of Kit Fine on modality and essence, appeals instead to our capacity to grasp essences, understood in a neo-Aristotelian fashion, according to which essences are expressed by ‘real definitions’. (shrink)

A collection of writings on Buddhist philosophy.

Scholarly papers by Gėlėgzhamt︠s︡yn Luvsant︠s︡ėrėn on Mādhyamika, Buddhist philosophy, Mongolian philosophy and Buddhist studies in Mongolia.

Ancient moral philosophers, especially Aristotle and his followers, typically shared the assumption that ethics is primarily concerned with how to achieve the final end for human beings, a life of “happiness” or “human flourishing.” This final end was not a subjective condition, such as contentment or the satisfaction of our preferences, but a life that could be objectively determined to be appropriate to our nature as human beings. Character traits were treated as moral virtues because they contributed well toward this (...) ideal life, either as means to it or as constitutive aspects of it. Traits that tended to prevent a “happy” life were considered vices, even if they contributed to a life that was pleasant and what a person most wanted. The idea of “happiness” was central, then, in philosophical efforts to specify what we ought to do, what sort of persons we should try to become, and what sort of life a wise person would hope for. (shrink)

The abilities to attribute an action to its proper agent and to understand its meaning when it is produced by someone else are basic aspects of human social communication. Several psychiatric syndromes, such as schizophrenia, seem to lead to a dysfunction of the awareness of one’s own action as well as of recognition of actions performed by other. Such syndromes offer a framework for studying the determinants of agency, the ability to correctly attribute actions to their veridical source. Thirty normal (...) subjects and 30 schizophrenic patients with and without hallucinations and/or delusional experiences were required to execute simple finger and wrist movements, without direct visual control of their hand. The image of either their own hand or an alien hand executing the same or a different movement was presented on a TV-screen in real time. The task for the subjects was to discriminate whether the hand presented on the screen was their own or not. Hallucinating and deluded schizophrenic patients were more impaired in discriminating their own hand from the alien one than the non-hallucinating ones, and tended to misattribute the alien hand to themselves. Results are discussed according to a model of action control. A tentative description of the mechanisms leading to action consciousness is proposed. (shrink)

Richard Heersmink argues that self‐narratives are distributed across embodied organisms and their environment, given that their building blocks, autobiographical memories, are distributed. This argument faces two problems. First, it commits a fallacy of composition. Second, it relies on Marya Schechtman's narrative self‐constitution view, which is incompatible with the distributed cognition framework. To solve these problems, this article develops an alternative account of self‐narratives. On this account, we actively connect distributed autobiographical memories through distributed conversational and textual self‐narrative practices. This account (...) enhances our understanding of the memory–narrative nexus and has implications for philosophical conceptions of self. (shrink)